Criminal Attempts at Common Law by Keedy, Edwin R.
[Vol. 102
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS AT COMMON LAW
Edwin R. Keedy t
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Much has been written on the law of attempts to commit crimes 1
and much more will be written for this is one of the most interesting
and difficult problems of the criminal law.2 In many discussions of
criminal attempts decisions dealing with common law attempts, stat-
utory attempts and aggravated assaults, such as assaults with intent
to murder or to rob, are grouped indiscriminately. Since the defini-
tions of statutory attempts frequently differ from the common law
concepts,8 and since the meanings of assault differ widely,4 it is be-
" Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARv. L. REv. 491 (1903); Hoyles, The
Essentials of Crime, 46 CAN. L.J. 393, 404 (1910) ; Cook, Act, Intention and Motive
in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917) ; Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv.
L. REv. 821 (1928) ; Tulin, The Role of Penalties in the Criminal Law, 37 YALE L.J.
1048 (1928) ; Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction,
40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930); Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, 19 GEo.
L.J. 185, 316 (1931); Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts,
78 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 962 (1930); Derby, Criminal Attempt-A Discussion of Some
New York Cases, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 464 (1932); Turner, Attempts to Commit
Crimes, 5 CA=. L.J. 230 (1934) ; Skilton, The Mental Element in a Criminal
Attempt, 3 U. OF PiTT. L. REv. 181 (1937) ; Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal
Attempt, 3 U. OF PiTT. L. REV. 308 (1937) ; Hitchler, Criminal Attempts, 43 DIcK.
L. REv. 211 (1939); Strahorn, Preparation for Crime as a Criminal Attempt, 1
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1939); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW,
cc. 3 and 4 (1947) ; Edwards, Criminal Attempts, 15 MOD. L. REv. 345 (1952).
For a history of the English law of criminal attempts see, Sayre, supra at 821-
837; Curran, supra at 191-202; HALL, op. cit. supra at 61-88.
2. "This doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is one of the most
important, and at the same time most intricate, titles of the criminal law." Peyton,
C. J., in Cunningham v. State, 49 Miss. 685, 701 (1874).
"The subject of this chapter [Attempt] is alike intricate and important. The
reports are full of cases upon it, yet it is but imperfectly understood by the courts."
1 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW § 725.1 (8th ed. 1892).
3. For example, a Georgia statute provides that "If any person shall attempt
to commit a crime and in such attempt shall do any act toward the commission
of such crime, but shall fail in the perpetration thereof, or shall be prevented or
intercepted from executing the same, he shall . . . be punished. . . ." GA. CODE
ANN. tit. 27, § 2507 (1953). The Georgia Supreme Court in applying this statute,
which was enacted in 1833, stated that "The word 'attempt' ordinarily implies an
act, an effort, but the General Assembly, in this statute, uses it as synonymous with
'intend'." McDonald, J., in Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493, 497 (1858). The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, referring to a similar statute, stated that it created
"a peculiar statutory offense." Fletcher, J., in Commonvealth v. McDonald, 5 Cush.
365, 366 (Mass. 1850). Under a similar statute in New York a solicitation was held
to constitute an attempt. People v. Bush, 4 Hill 133 (N.Y. 1843). The present
statutory definition of attempt in that state is "An act, done with intent to commit
a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission ... " N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 2. This provision was held to include a solicitation. People v. Bloom, 149 App.
Div. 295, 133 N.Y. Supp. 708 (2d Dep't 1912).
4. Assault is sometimes defined as an attempted battery. Lane v. State, 85 Ala.
11, 4 So. 730 (1887); Commonwealth v. Remley, 257 Ky. 209, 77 S.W.2d 784
(464)
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lieved that it will tend to a clarification of the problem to confine the
present discussion to attempts at common law.
Most common law crimes involve actual damage 5 to person or
property. Thus murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem and robbery
require damage to the person, while arson requires damage to real
property and larceny, damage to personal property. On the other
hand some common law crimes may be committed although there is
no damage but only the danger of damage. Solicitation to commit
a felony is a crime although the person solicited refuses or simply
fails to commit it.' The crime of conspiracy is complete although
no overt act is done to carry out the purpose of the conspiracy.
7
The characteristic of both these crimes is the danger of damage. Libel
is a crime because it tends to a breach of the peace and it is immaterial
that the person libelled takes no action of any kind.8 In the case of
certain common law misdemeanors the gist of the offense is the tend-
ency to damage the public or some function of government, although
no damage in fact occurs. Thus" it has been held that it is an indictable
offense to carry a child suffering from smallpox along a public highway
although no person is thereby infected.' An offer to bribe a public
official is punishable although the bribe is refused.'0 To speak
insulting words of a magistrate is a misdemeanor although it does
not appear that the administration of the criminal law was thereby
affected. 1
(1934); Merritt v. Commonweath, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 (1935). It is also
defined as putting another in apprehension of unpermitted contact. See State v.
Gorham, 55 N.H. 152 (1875); State v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 38 Atl. 653 (1897);
State v. Williams, 186 N.C. 627, 120 S.E. 224 (1923); 2 BIsHOP, op. cit. supra
note 2, at § 23. Assault is also held to mean a battery. State v. Brewer, 31 Del.
363, 114 At. 604 (1921); People v. Benson, 321 Ill. 605, 152 N.E. 514 (1926);
Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927). See Note, Attempt, Assault
and Assault with Intent, 14 MICH. L. Rnv. 399 (1916).
5. The word "damage," as used in this connection, means factual detriment
(damnum), as distinguished from legal wrong (injuria). This distinction occurs
in the phrases, damnum absque injuria and injuria sine damno.
The word "harm" is sometimes used to include both damage and the danger of
damage. HALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 110-116; Curran, supra note 1, at 333.
Sed also Hall, Science and Reform in Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 787, 801
(1952).
6. Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801); Walsh v. People, 65
Ill. 58 (1872); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 Adt. 388 (1892).
7. The Poulterers' Case, 9 Co. Rep. 55b, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611); Rex v.
Eccles, 1 Leach 274, 168 Eng. Rep. 240 (1783) ; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harris & J.
317 (Md. 1821) ; Commonwealth v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Super. 410, 24 A.2d 762 (1942).
8. Rex v. Summers, 3 Salk. 194, 91 Eng. Rep. 772 (1701); State v. Avery, 7
Conn. 266 (1828); ODGERS, LiPEL AND SLANDER, 443 (3d ed. 1896).
9. Rex v. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73, 105 Eng. Rep. 762 (1815) ; Rex v. Burnett,
4 M. & S. 272, 105 Eng. Rep. 835 (1815).
10. State v. Ellis, 33 N.J.L. 102 (1868).
11. Rex v. Darby, 3 Mod. 139, 87 Eng. Rep. 89 (1687); Rex v. Revel, 1 Str.
420, 93 Eng. Rep. 609 (1721).
1954]
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Like the offenses enumerated above, attempt is a crime because
it causes either (1) damage or (2) the danger of damage. If one
man with the intent to kill another man shoots him but fails to kill
him this is an attempt to murder. Also if with the same intent he
shoots at, but just misses, the other man, who is unaware of the
shooting, this is likewise an attempt to murder. In the first case
there is damage, while in the second there is the danger of damage.
Where the door of a building was broken, but there was no evidence
of an entry, it was held that the defendant was guilty of an attempt
to commit burglary.12  Here there was damage. It has likewise
been held to be an attempt to commit burglary where the defendants
with the intent to break into a building went up the outer steps.' 3
Here there was no damage but sufficient danger of damage. The
offer to bribe a public official is sufficient to constitute an attempt
although the official refuses to accept the bribe,' because there is the
danger of damage.
The first requisite of a criminal attempt is the intent to commit
a specific crime. '-' Thus for an attempt to murder A there must be
the intent to murder A and for an attempt to steal the coat of A
it is necessary that there be the intent to steal the coat of A. While
the completed crime of the murder of A may be committed without
the intent to murder A,1" and even without the intent to murder any
person,' 7 there can be no attempt to murder A unless there exists
the intent to murder A.
Intent as used in this connection must be distinguished from
motive, desire and expectation.' If C by reason of his hatred of A
12. State v. Carr, 146 Mo. 1, 47 S.W. 790 (1898).
13. Commonwealth v. Clark, 10 Pa. Co. 444 (1891).
14. Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 2494, 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (1769). "And in many
cases, especially in bribery at elections to parliament, the attempt is a crime: it is
complete on his side who offers it." Lord Mansfield, 4 Burr. at 2500, 98 Eng. Rep.
at 311. Also Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58 (1872).
15. Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox C.C. 463 (1854); Cockburn, C.J., in Regina v.
Gray, 1 Dears. & Bell. 303, 306, 169 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1018 (1857) ; Regina v. Taylor,
1 F. & F. 511, 175 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859); Regina v. Duckworth [1892] 2 Q.B. 83
(1892) ; State v. Meadows, 18 W. Va. 658 (1881) ; Heard v. State, 38 Ind. App.
511, 78 N.E. 358 (1906); State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, 101 Pac. 557 (1909);
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504 (1922); State v. Sullivan,
146 Me. 381, 82 A.2d 629 (1951).
16. Shooting at one person and killing another. State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120,
13 S.E. 319 (1891).
17. Killing a person while engaged in the commission of a felony. Regina v.
Greenwood, 7 Cox C.C. 404 (1857).
18. Writers on jurisprudence emphasize the distinction between intent and
motive. 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRoDucToN To THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 137, 161 (1823); 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 355 (4th ed. 1879) ; Amos, THE
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plans to kill him, but mistaking B for A shoots B, his motive, desire
and expectation are to kill A but his intent is to kill B.19 If a
married man forcibly has intercourse with a woman whom he believes
to be his wife's twin sister, but who in fact is his wife, he is not guilty
of rape because his intent was to have intercourse with the
woman he attacked, who was in fact his wife. If A takes an umbrella
which he believes to belong to B, but which in fact is his own, he
does not have the intent to steal, his intent being to take the umbrella
he grasps in his hand, which is his own umbrella.20 If a man,
mistaking a dummy in female dress for a woman, tries to ravish it
he does not have the intent to commit rape since the ravishment of
an inanimate object cannot be rape.2 . If a man mistakes a stump
for his enemy and shoots at it, notwithstanding his desire and expecta-
tion to shoot his enemy, his intent is to shoot the object aimed at,
which is the stump.22
SCIENCE OF LAW 102-105 (8th ed. 1896) ; POLLOCK, A FIRST BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE
138, 139 (1896); MAI.cY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 116, 117 (4th ed. 1889); SALmOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 523 (9th ed. 1937); KEEoTN, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 211 (2d ed. 1949).
"Suppose X wishes to kill A with a rifle bullet. B is standing between X and
A, so that the bullet from X's rifle, if it is to reach A, must necessarily pass
through B's body. In spite of this, X aims and fires, and the bullet, pursuing the
course X wishes, passes through B's body before it strikes A. Here clearly all
would agree that X intended the bullet to go through B's body, for only by having
it do so could the purpose for which he fired be accomplished." Cook, supra note
1, at 656.
"Intent, in its legal sense, is quite distinct from motive. It is defined as the
purpose to use a particular means to effect a certain result. Motive is the reason
which leads the mind to desire that result." Dodge, J., in Baker v. State, 120 Wis.
135, 145, 97 N.W. 566, 570 (1903).
For other cases involving the distinction between intent and motive see Regina
v. Sharpe, 7 Cox C.C. 214 (1857) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (D. Kan. 1891).
19. Regina v. Smith, Dears. 559, 169 Eng. Rep. 845 (1855); McGehee v. State,
62 Miss. 772 (1885).
20. Turner, supra note 1, at 238.
21. 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 742.
22. In discussing the "stump case" Professor Beale stated that "the thing which
the actor aims to do is to bring his bullet into violent contact with the object seen."
Beale; supra note 1, at 494.
Professor Sayre expressed the opinion that the defendant in the "stump case"
should be guilty of an attempt to kill his enemy if he acted like a reasonable man
in mistaking the stump for his enemy. Sayre, supra note 1, at 853.
In Conan Doyle's story, The Adventure of the Empty House, Sherlock Holmes
learned that his enemy, Colonel Moran, planned to shoot him while he was in the
front room of his house on Baker Street. Accordingly Holmes had a wax bust
of himself made, which he placed in such a position between a reading lamp and
the window that it cast a shadow on the shade. Colonel Moran from an empty
house across the street from Holmes' chambers, using the shadow as a guide, shot
and hit the bust which he believed to be Holmes. At the time of the shooting
Holmes and an inspector of police were hiding in a room of the house from which
Moran shot. When Moran was arrested by the inspector, immediately after the
shooting, Holmes asked what charge he planned to make against Moran. The in-
spector replied "The attempted murder of Mr. Sherlock Holmes." While Moran's
motive, desire and expectation were to shoot Holmes, his intent was to hit the object
19541
468 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
It has been suggested that if B stabs the dead body of A, without
being aware that A is dead, B may be guilty of an attempt to murder
A.2" This seems clearly incorrect. Although B wished to kill A,
he intended to stab the body he saw, which was a corpse. Further
than this, it is difficult to see how one can attempt to murder a man
who no longer exists.
It is sometimes stated that an attempt requires a "specific intent." 24
This is not accurate terminology. What must be specific is the crime
which is intended. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has correctly
stated that an attempt requires "an intent to do a specific thing." 2
After it has been established that there exists an intent to commit
a specific crime, such as intent to murder A, the question then arises
as to what is further required in order to constitute an attempt. Since,
as previously stated, an attempt is a crime because it results in damage
or sufficient danger of damage, it necessarily results that one of these
,elements must follow the intent. It is a difficult matter to state exactly
what constitutes sufficient danger of damage and courts frequently
disagree in their answers to this problem. At the outset, however,
it may be stated that some act must be done towards carrying out
the intent. There must be a start towards the accomplishment of the
result intended. Courts agree that if there is nothing more than
preparation for the commission of the crime intended an attempt has
not be.en committed.26  Thus it has been held that purchasing a gun,27
casting the shadow which was the wax bust, consequently he was not guilty of an
attempt to murder Holmes.
"Let us suppose the old moot case of A shooting at a bust, believing the bust to
be his old enemy, B. Whatever A's intention may have been before he saw the
bust and aimed at it, the fact is that at the particular moment of concentration in
aiming at the bust he merely intended to kill the object which was before him,
namely, a bust. Had he done all he intended to do at this particular moment, he
could only have killed a bust, and this is no crime." Skilton, The Mental Element
in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. or Pirr. L. Ray. 181, 187 (1937).
23. "There is nothing in principle to prevent a person from being found guilty
of attempting to murder by stabbing a person already dead. . . ." Turner, supra
note 1, at 246. Professor Sayre expressed the opinion that "although the defendant
could not of course be convicted for murder, he should be held liable for an attempt
to kill if his belief that the victim was still living was under all the circumstances
a natural and reasonable one." Sayre, supra note 1, at 853 n.103.
24. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMINAL LAW 180 (2d ed. 1912); Sayre, supra
note 1, at 841; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 962, 969 (1930); Arnold, supra note 1, at 68.
25. Mitchell, J., in Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 21, 42 Atl. 374, 377
(1899). An attempt requires "an intent to do a particular thing." 1 BISHOP,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 728.
26. "It is clear that mere preparations for the intended crime, antecedent to the
actual commencement of the crime itself, do not amount to an indictable attempt"
KENNY, Ou_IN Es OF CRIMINAL LAW 80 (1902).
27. Blackburn, J., in Regina v. Cheeseman, 9 Cox C.C. 100, 103, 169 Eng. Rep.
1337 (1862); Deady, J., in United States v. Stephens, 8 Sawy. 116, 119, 12 Fed.
52, 55 (D. Ore. 1882).
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purchasing poison,28 purchasing and loading a gun 29 constitute prepara-
tion for murder. Likewise the following acts amount only to prepara-
tion: buying matches to commit arson,30 giving a woman cantharides
in order to commit rape,31 going to an illicit still to buy whiskey
for a sale,3 2 buying poison and soliciting another to put it in intended
victim's coffee for the offense of administering poison,33 watching
a person's house and procuring a rope to tie him in a robbery,84
procuring "hack saws" to use in jail breaking, 5 arranging a pretended
theft of jewelry in order to obtain money by false pretenses. 6
It is likewise well settled at common law that there can be no
conviction for an attempt if the intended crime has been consummated. 7
This logically follows from the ordinary meaning of attempt, which
is "to try" or "to endeavor." 8 However, statutes in some states
have changed the rule of the common law.3 9
The requirements that preparation is not sufficient for an attempt
and that there is not an attempt if the intended crime was completed,
may be expressed in terms applicable to a race by saying that the
starting line must be crossed and the finish line must not be reached.
The difficult problem is to determine how far past the starting line
the actor must proceed in order to constitute an attempt. He cannot
proceed far enough if the means employed are not reasonably adapted
to carry out his intent, for in such case there can be no damage or
danger of damage, one of which is necessary for an attempt. Thus
there cannot be an attempt to discharge a pistol if there was no
28. Ibid.
29. Field, C. J., in People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859). Buying a pistol and
taking a ticket to the place where the intended victim is expected to be is only
preparation for murder. KENNY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 80.
30. Pollock, C.B., in Regina v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511, 512, 175 Eng. Rep. 831
(1859).
31. State v. Lung, 21 Nev. 209, 28 Pac. 235 (1891).
32. Andrews v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 451, 115 S.E. 558 (1923).
33. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S.E. 1024 (1889).
34. Mitchell, J., in Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 22, 42 Atl. 374, 377
(1899).
35. State v. Hurley, 79 Vt. 28, 64 Atl. 78 (1906).
36. Rex v. Robinson, [1915] 2 K.B. 342 (1915). Inviting a young boy into
an automobile is only preparation for the offense of gross indecency. People v.
Pippin, 316 Mich. 191, 25 N.W.2d 164 (1946).
37. Regina v. Nicholls, 2 Cox C.C. 182 (1847); Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190
Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899) ; Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N.E. 179 (1899).
38. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrioNARY (2d ed. 1949). It has been
stated that if the intended offense was completed ". . . the attempt became merged
in the greater offence. . . ." IENNY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 82.
39. "A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although
it appears on the trial that the crime was consummated, unless the court, in its
discretion, discharges the jury and directs the defendant to be tried for the crime
itself." N.Y. PENAL CODE § 260. For a similar provision see CAL. PENAL CODE
§663 (1949); WAsH. REv. CODE §9.01.070 (1951).
19541
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priming 40 nor can the firing of a pistol loaded only with powder and
wadding be sufficient for an attempt to assassinate.4 An attempt to
distill alcohol cannot be committed unless an appliance called a "worm"
is used.4 2 If a person with the intent to kill another invokes witch-
craft, charms, incantations,43 maledictions, hexing 4 or voodoo 4' this
cannot constitute an attempt to murder since the means employed are
not in any way adapted to accomplish the intended result. Striking
a man with a small switch cannot constitute an attempt to murder
him. However, a small switch may be adequate to kill an infant and
an attempt to murder the infant can be committed by such means.
In the much discussed case of State v. Clarissa46 it was held
that administering a harmless substance thought to be poisonous can-
not constitute an attempt to murder. Some writers have had difficulty
in distinguishing State v. Clarissa from the case of State v. Glover 
47
decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.4 In this case the
defendant was indicted for the statutory offense of assault with intent
to kill by the administering of a poison. The defendant forced an
infant to drink a poisonous drug but the amount was not enough to
cause serious bodily injury. The court in affirming the conviction
stated, ". . . the gist of the offense is in the intent, though there
must be also some act in the direction of such intent." 4' The opinion
of the court was devoted entirely to the requirements of the statutory
offense, and there was no reference to an attempt. The two cases
may also be distinguished on another ground, viz., that there was
actual damage to the person of the infant in the Glover case. In this
40. Regina v. Gamble, 10 Cox C.C. 545 (1867).
41. Regina v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 525, 175 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840).
42. Trent v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1128, 156 S.E. 567 (1931).
43. "If a statute simply made it a felony to attempt to kill any human being
or to conspire to do so, an attempt by means of witchcraft, or a conspiracy to kill
by means of charms and incantations, would not be an offense within such a statute.
The poverty of language compels one to say 'an attempt to kill by means of witch-
craft,' but such an attempt is really no attempt at all to kill." Pollock, C.B., in
Attorney Gen. v. Sillem, 2 H. & C. 431, 525, 159 Eng. Rep. 178, 221 (1863).
44. Maxey, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 152, 167
Atl. 344, 348 (1933). "Hexing" is a local term in sections of the United States
for the practice of witchcraft. See WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1949).
45. "Even though a 'voodoo doctor' just arrived here from Haiti actually be-
lieved that his malediction would surely bring death to the person on whom he was
invoking it, I can not conceive of an American court upholding a conviction of such
a maledicting 'doctor' for attempted murder or even attempted assault and battery."
Maxey, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 153, 167 AtI. 344,
348 (1933).
46. 11 Ala. 57 (1847).
47. Arnold, supra note 1, at 71 n.35; Strahorn, The Effect of Imporsibility on
Criminal Attempts, 78 U. OF PA. L. RE-. 962, 976-8 (1930).
48. 27 S.C. 602, 4 S.E. 564 (1888).
49. Id. at 605, 4 S.E. at 565.
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS AT COMMON LAW
connection the court stated that ". .. some physical force must have
been exerted to compel so small a child to drink such a nauseous
drug." 50
It is sometimes stated that it is sufficient for an attempt if the
means are apparently adapted to accomplishing the result intended.
Thus Bishop says, "The adaptation need only be apparent; because the
evil to be corrected relates to apparent danger rather than to actual
injury sustained." 51 While it is true that actual damage is not neces-
sary, the danger must be actual and not merely apparent. To "snap
a toy gun" at a man cannot constitute an attempt to kill 52 and there
would be no more danger of damage if the toy gum resembled a real
gun and the person snapping it believed it to be such. A pistol,
which cannot be discharged because of defective mechanism, is not
adapted to shooting a man and, even though the defect was unknown
to the person trying to fire the pistol, there could not be an attempt
to murder.
According to the decisions of courts, not every act done beyond
preparation will be sufficient for an attempt. 3 Thus taking a blunder-
buss by defendant from a folded coat on his arm with intent to kill
the prosecutor, but being seized before he could aim and fire, is not
an attempt to discharge a loaded firearm at prosecutor.54 Soliciting
50. Id. at 608, 4 S.E. at 567.
51. 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 754. No authorities were cited for this
statement.
Bishop also stated that: "... in reason and by the better authorities a mere
apparent adaptation suffices, though there are cases which seem to require it to be
complete." 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 749. To this statement there is the fol-
lowing footnote: "See and compare Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. 220; Mullen v. State;
45 Ala. 43; State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113; Regina v. Gamble, 11 Cox C.C. 545;
State v. Epperson, 27 Mo. 255; Regina v. Dale, 6 Cox C.C. 14; Sumpter v. State,
11 Fla. 247; People v.. Blake, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 490; Regina v. Goodman, 22
U.C.C.P. 338." In the Kunkle, Mullen, Napper and Epperson cases the charge was
the statutory offense of assault with intent to murder. In Sumpter v. State the
offense charged was "administering poison." In People v. Blake the indictment
charged ". . . procuring a . . . vegetable powder, called cow-itch, and putting the
same . . . in a tub of water used by prosecutor. . . ." The defendant in Regina
v. Dale was indicted for attempt to administer poison but the problem under discus-
sion was not raised. In Regina v. Gamble the judge stated that "a person can not
attempt to discharge a pistol if it had no priming in it." In Regina v. Goodnunl
the charge was attempt to commit arson. The Court in affirming the conviction
quoted with approval the statement of Pollock, C.B., in Regina v. Taylor (1 F. &
F. 512, 175 Eng. Rep. 831) that "The act must be one . . . committed under
such circumstances that he has the power of carrying his intention into execution."
The statements in the Gamble and Goodman cases support the view that the adapta-
tion of the means employed must be actual and not merely apparent.
52. CLARi, CRIMINAL LAW 145 (3d ed., Mikell, 1915).
53. Some statutes provide that there may be an attempt if any act has been done
towards the consummation of the intended crime. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. tit. 27,
§2507 (1953); WASH. Rsv. CODE § 9.01.070 (1951).
54. Regina v. Lewis, 9 C. & P. 523, 173 Eng. Rep. 940 (1840). Putting finger
on trigger of loaded pistol and then being prevented from firing is not sufficient act
for an attempt. Regina v. St. George, 9 C. & P. 483, 173 Eng. Rep. 921 (1840),
overruled by Regina v. Duckworth, [1892] 2 Q.B. 83 (1892).
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B to poison A with directions how to proceed and putting a package
of poison in B's pocket without his knowledge are not sufficient for
an attempt to administer poison to A. 5 Soliciting and paying B to
murder A and giving information how to identify A do not go far
enough for an attempt to murder A.5 Arming oneself for the purpose
of killing another and then seeking and finding him, with no further
act, do not constitute an attempt. 7 Urging a married woman to have
intercourse with defendant is not an attempt to commit adultery. 8
Inducing a little girl to go into a woods and snatching a button from
her snow suit are not sufficient for an attempt to commit rape."
In contrast with these examples it was decided in the following cases
that the act went sufficiently far towards carrying out the requisite
intent to constitute an attempt: preparing combustibles and lighting a
match which failed to ignite combustibles-attempted arson; '0 par-
tially disrobing-attempted adultery; 6' breaking window of building-
attempted burglary; I2 dislodging a diamond shirt stud which fell to
the floor-attempted larceny; ' putting poison in the victim's wine
glass-attempted murder; " striking a woman with fists and removing
her clothing-attempted rape; ' striking a person-attempt to rob.6"
55. Stabler v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 318 (1880).
56. State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (1928). The majority of the
court described the defendant's acts as preparation. A dissenting judge was of the
opinion that there was an attempt.
57. Henry, C.J., in State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 60, 1 S.W. 825, 826 (1886).
"The law does not punish every act which is done with the intent to bring about
a crime. If a man starts from Boston to Cambridge for the purpose of committing
a murder when he gets there, but is stopped. by the draw and goes home, he is no
more punishable than if he had sat in his chair and resolved to shoot sombody, but
on second thoughts had given up the notion." HOLMES, CoMmsoN LAw 68 (1881).
58. State v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac. 1093 (1894).
59. Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 477, 5 S.E.2d 491 (1939).
60. Regina v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511, 175 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859).
61. State v. Schwarzbach, 84 N.J.L. 268, 86 Atl. 423 (1913).
62. Regina v. Spanner, 12 Cox C.C. 155 (1872). Accord, Commonwealth v.
Shedd, 140 Mass. 451, 5 N.E. 254 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 25 Pa. Super.
490 (1904).
63. State v. Johnson, 78 Kan. 866, 98 Pac. 216 (1908). Shooting a hog with
intent to steal it but being frightened away before removing carcass constitutes
attempt to commit larceny. Tinker v. State, 125 Ga. 743, 54 S.E. 662 (1906).
Arranging for the purchase of a barrel of molasses, knowing it to be stolen, and
having it rolled out to a truck constitutes an attempt to receive stolen goods
feloniously. State v. Parker, 224 N.C. 524, 31 S.E.2d 531 (1944).
64. Rex v. White, [1910] 2 K.B. 124 (1910). Putting poison in food which
was not swallowed because of its bitter taste was held sufficient for attempted murder.
Johnson v. State, 1 Ala. App. 102, 55 So. 321 (1911).
65. State v. Swan, 131 N.J.L. 67, 34 A.2d 734 (1943). Throwing a woman
down and choking her was held sufficient for an attempt to rape. Ingram v. Com-
monwealth, 192 Va. 794, 66 S.E.2d 846 (1951).
66. Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899). Threatening
the owner of liquor with a gun in order to make him disclose the location of the
liquor was held sufficient to constitute attempt to rob. Commonwealth v. Crow, 303
Pa. 91, 154 Atl. 283 (1931). Likewise striking a person with a blackjack and
"frisking" his clothing. State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 402, 42 S.E.2d 465 (1947).
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It is important to note, in determining how far the act or acts
have advanced towards the completion of the crime, that three dis-
tinct stages must be considered. They are (1) preparation, (2) an act
towards carrying out the intent which has not progressed sufficiently
far to be an attempt and (3) an act or acts which are sufficient for an
attempt.67 These three situations may be illustrated as follows:
Preparation Insufficient act Sufficient act
Procuring gun Starting with gun to- Shooting at victim and
ward intended victim just missing him
Procuring matches Going towards house Lighting combustibles
and meeting confed- which are extin-
erate guished
Making impression of Going to look at build- Breaking. window of
lock ing building
If the act or acts committed in furtherance of the required intent
have proceeded far enough to constitute an attempt, the fact that the
actor then voluntarily abandons his undertaking does not relieve him
from responsibility for the attempt.6" The damage or danger of
damage in such a case is just as great as where an extraneous force
prevents him from proceeding further. A man who is choking a
woman with murderous intent is just as guilty of an attempt to murder
where he voluntarily discontinues his attack as where he is forcibly
67. Some writers contrast only preparation and attempt. See Sayre, supra note
1, at 845 and HALL, op. cit supra note 1, at 103.
68. State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 (1883) ; Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10,
42 Atl. 374 (1899); Glover v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 382, 10 S.E. 420 (1889);
State v. McGilvery, 20 Wash. 240, 55 Pac. 115 (1898). In the Glover case
Lewis, J., stated the following: "It is a rule, founded in reason and supported
by authority, that if a man resolves on a criminal enterprise, and proceeds so far
in it that his act amounts to an indictable attempt, it does not cease to be such, al-
though he voluntarily abandoned the evil purpose." 86 Va. at 386, 10 S.E. at 421.
A case frequently cited in support of the above proposition is Lewis v. State,
35 Ala. 380 (1860). In this case the defendant, a slave, was convicted of an attempt
to rape on evidence that -with the intent to ravish he pursued the prosecutrix for
over a mile, but failed to overtake her. On the question of abandonment Stone, J.,
stated the following: "If the proof shows that Lewis voluntarily desisted from the
pursuit, when the accomplishment of his imputed purpose was probably, or even
possibly attainable, this is a circumstance which should weigh much against the
truth of the charge contained in the indictment. On the contrary, if he abandoned
the pursuit, because he was unable to overtake Miss Ozley, or because he feared
to proceed further, lest he should encounter other opposition, then the fact that he
desisted should weigh nothing in his favor." Id. at 389.
Wharton expressed the opinion that "If an attempt be voluntarily and freely
abandoned before the act is put in process of final execution, there being no outside
cause prompting such abandonment, then this is a defense." 1 WHAMTON, CRIMINAL
LAW 306 (12th ed. 1932). He gives as a reason for this view that in such a case
there is no damage. Id. at 307. There may, however, be sufficient danger of damage
to constitute an attempt.
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prevented from further action by another person. If a match is lighted
to set fire to a house the result is the same whether the match is blown
out by the wind or by the person who lighted it.
Some judges and writers have announced arbitrary tests for
determining when the act or acts, committed in furtherance of the
required intent, have proceeded sufficiently far towards its accomplish-
ment to constitute an attempt. The extent to which these tests differ
can be readily noted from the following enumeration:
"The actus reus of an attempt to commit a specific crime is con-
stituted when the accused does an act which is a step towards the
commission of that specific crime, and the doing of such act can have
no other purpose than the commission of that specific crime;" " "The
act must be one immediately and directly tending to the execution of
the principal crime;" 7' "the overt act must be sufficiently proximate
to the intended crime to form one of the natural series of acts, which
the intent requires for its full execution;" " "act of which the natural
and probable effect under the circumstances is the accomplishment of
a substantive crime;" 72 "act must reach far enough towards the ac-
complishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement
of the consummation;" ' "an act . . . forming part of a series of
acts, which would constitute its actual commission if it were not inter-
rupted;" 71 "act [or acts] must be such as will apparently 7i result,
in the usual and natural course of events, if not hindered by extraneous 76
causes, in the commission of the crime itself." 77
69. Turner, supra note 1, at 236. "It is sufficient that one step be taken towards
the commission of the contemplated crime." HocHHamE, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PaocEuE 297 (2d ed. 1904).
70. Pollock, C.B., in Regina v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511, 512, 175 Eng. Rep. 831
(1859). See similar statement by Brown, C.J., in State v. Lampe, 131 Minn. 65,
69, 154 N.W. 737, 738 (1915).
71. Mitchell, J., in Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 21, 42 Atl. 374, 377
(1899).
72. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 57, at 65. A similar statement was made by
Ashe, J., in State v. Colvin, 90 N.C. 717, 718 (1884).
73. Lewis, P., in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 86 Va. 223, 226, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025
(1889). Accord, Sherwood, J., in State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. 143, 162, 49 S.W. 1017,
1021 (1899).
74. ST=EN, DIGEST OF THE CRIPJMiNAL LAW 37 (1883). Accord, 1 WHARTON,
op. cit. supra note 68, at 294. Baldrige, J., in Commonwealth v. Neubauer, 142 Pa.
Super. 528, 533, 16 A.2d 450, 452 (1940).
75. Emphasis added.
76. Emphasis added.
77. The Chancellor in Sipple v. State, 46 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1884). "To make
an intentional act an indictable attempt it must go so far that it would result, or
apparently result in an the actual commission of the crime it was designed to effect,
if not extrinsically hindered or frustrated by extraneous circumstances." Fine, J.,
in Commonwealth v. Kelley, 162 Pa. Super. 526, 529, 58 A.2d 375, 376 (1948). The
act "need not be the next preceding or proximate act necessary to consummation
of the crime intended." Boyce, J., in State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 46, 90 Atl. 220,
223 (1914). Accord, Chichester, J., in Lee v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 594, 599,
131 S.E. 212, 214 (1926).
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Most writers recognize that the extent to which an act or acts
must proceed towards the accomplishment of the intended crime cannot
be determined by any arbitrary rule. For example, Stephen stated
the following:
"The law as to what amounts to an attempt is of neces-
sity vague. It has been said in various forms that the act must bd
closely connected with the actual commission of the offence, but no
distinct line upon the subject has been or as I should suppose can
be drawn." 78
According to Professor Kenny there must be "some physical
act which helps, and helps in a sufficiently 'proximate' degree,
towards carrying out the crime contemplated." 79 Professor Beale
has said that "The attempt must come sufficiently near completion
to be of public concern." 8 Consistent with what was said at the
beginning of this article regarding the nature of a criminal attempt,
the act or acts must proceed so far towards the accomplishment of
the intended crime as to constitute, in the opinion of the court in the
particular case, sufficient damage or danger of damage.
Although no exact rule can be laid down for determining how
near accomplishment it is necessary to proceed in order to constitute
an attempt several writers and judges have suggested, as a practical
working guide, that the more serious the crime intended the less far
need the actor proceed in order that an attempt may result. Thus
Bishop has stated, "Though in attempt some act must accompany the
special intent, still, as the thing noticed by the law is the sum of both,
the act may be less and proceed less far in proportion as the intent is
in enormity greater." "1 It seems reasonable that the law should be
more concerned when a person goes half way towards committing
a murder than when he proceeds equally far in his effort to commit
a battery.
78. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CImINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 224 (1883).
79. YEN=EY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 82.
80. Beale, supra note 1, at 501. The act must be "sufficient both in magnitude
and in proximity to the fact intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law that does
not concern itself with things trivial and small." 1 BisHoP, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 728.
81. 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 760. The following statement by Holmes, J.,
has been frequently cited: "Any unlawful application of poison is an evil which
threatens death, according to common apprehension, and the gravity of the crime,
the uncertainty of the result, and the seriousness of the apprehension, coupled with
the great harm likely to result from poison even if not enough to kill, would warrant
holding the liability for an attempt to begin at a point more remote from the possi-
bility of accomplishing what is expected than might be the case with lighter crimes."
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897). Although
the prosecution in this case was for a statutory attempt, the statement by Holmes is
equally applicable to a common law attempt.
To the same effect, Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380, 388 (1860); Beale, suspra note
1, at 502; Sayre, supra note 1, at 845; Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
"Legal Impossibility." The most elusive problem in the law of
criminal attempts is to determine whether there can be an attempt
if, under the circumstances of the particular case, it is impossible to
commit the intended crime. At the outset it seems advisable to
discuss what is sometimes termed "legal impossibility." ' In this
connection the cases of People v. Jaffe ' and Marley v. State " must
be considered. In People v. Jaffe the defendant was convicted of an
attempt to receive stolen goods. He purchased certain goods which
he mistakenly believed were stolen. The Court of Appeals of New
York reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant did
not have the necessary intent to receive stolen goods as he intended
to take these particular goods which were not stolen.' In Marley
Attempt, 3 U. OF PiTrr. L. REv. 308, 313 (1937). Referring to the proposition that
"the greater the intended offense, the less 'immediate! need conduct be to consti-
tute the relevant criminal attempt," Professor Hall states the following: "That it
will not bear critical scrutiny is apparent on reference to many of the cases where
serious criminal attempts were charged and the prosecution failed because the situa-
tions amounted merely to states of preparation." HALL, op. cit..supra note 1,
at 105.
82. See 1 BIsHOP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 753; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossi-
bility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 962, 986 (1930); MAY, LAW OF
CRIms 194 (4th ed., Sears and Weihofen, 1938).
83. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906). Although New York has a staute de-
fining attempt, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals was based on common law
principles.
84. 58 N.J.L. 207, 33 Atl. 208 (1895), approved in State v. Weleck, 10 N.J.
355, 91 A2d 751 (1952).
85. The court based its conclusion on the following statement by Bishop: "'If
what a man contemplates doing would not be in law a crime, he could not be said in
point of law to intend to commit the crime. If he thinks his act will be a crime
this is a mere mistake of his understanding where the law holds it not to be such,
his real intent being to do a particular thing. If the thing is not a crime he does not
intend to commit one whatever he may erroneously suppose.' (1 Bishop's Crim. Law
[7th ed.] sec. 742.)" People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 502, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (1906).
Chase, J., dissented saying, "That the defendant intended to commit a crime
is undisputed." Id. at 503, 78 N.E. at 171.
The majority opinion distinguished the decision in the earlier case of People v.
Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894). In that case a conviction of an attempt
to commit the crime of extortion was upheld, although the woman from whom the
defendant sought to obtain money by a threat to accuse her of a crime was not in-
duced by feat, since she was acting as a decoy of the police. The problem in the
Gardner case was not one of intent, as in the Jaffe case, but whether the act was
sufficient to constitute an attempt, the court saying that there was the "intent
to commit the crime of extortion." People v. Gardner, supra at 124, 38 N.E. at
1003 (1894). Professor Sayre expressed the opinion that the decision in the Jaffe
case was "apparently irreconcilable" with the decision in the Gardner case, Sayre,
supra note 1, at 854.
Wharton puts the following case: "Lady Eldon, when traveling with her hus-
band on the Continent, bought what she supposed to be a quantity of French lace,
which she hid, concealing it from Lord Eldon in one of the pockets of the coach.
The package was brought to light by a custom officer at Dover. The lace turned
out to be an English manufactured article, of little value, and of course, not subject
to duty. Lady Eldon had bought it at a price vastly above its value, believing it to
be genuine. . . ." Wharton expressed the opinion that Lady Eldon had the intent
to smuggle this lace into England and was guilty of an attempt to smuggle. 1
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v. State the defendants, who were members of the board of freeholders
of Passaic County, New Jersey, were convicted of an attempt to incur
obligations in behalf of the county in excess of amount provided by
law. On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that all
the acts done by the defendants were nugatory and reversed the con-
viction stating that (a) "the defendants have been convicted of an
attempt to commit a misdemeanor which was a legal impossibility"
and (b) "these defendants, even if the intent to commit the offense
can be imputed to them, did, in legal contemplation, no act towards
the accomplishment of such purpose, for every act they did was, in
the eye of the law, an absolute nullity." " The decisions in People
v. Jaffe and Marley v. State are easily explainable, without reference
to any conception of "legal impossibility." In the faffe case the
necessary intent, and in the Marley case a necessary act, was lacking.
In a Missouri case the defendant, who was convicted of attempting to
corrupt a juror, had tried to influence a man who was not a juror,
although defendant thought he was. The Missouri Supreme Court,
basing its decision on People v. Jaffe, reversed the conviction.
87
Another question of so-called "legal impossibility" is whether a
boy under the age of fourteen can commit an attempt to rape. Accord-
ing to a fixed rule of the common law the completed crime of rape
can not be committed by a boy under fourteen."8 Two reasons
have been stated for this rule, viz., (1) absence of the necessary mental
element and (2) lack of physical capacity. 9 No English cases were
WHARToN, CaRimInAL LAW 304 n.9 (12th ed. 1932). The fallacy of this argument
is found in the fact that the particular lace which Lady Eldon intended to bring
into England was not subject to duty and therefore, although there was the wish
to smuggle, there was not the intent to do so. Professor Sayre expressed the
opinion that Lady Eldon "intended to smuggle genuine French lace." Sayre, supra
note 1, at 852. Professor Arnold put the question--"Shall we say that this is an
attempt to smuggle French lace or that what she has attempted to do was to smuggle
that particular lace, which was not a crime?" Arnold, supra note 1, at 69. The
question was not answered.
A husband by having forcible intercourse with his wife is not guilty of rape.
1 HALE, P.C. *629; Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 8 Gray 489 (Mass. 1857). Nor does
he commit an attempt to ravish if he uses force but does not accomplish his purpose.
His intent is to have intercourse with the particular woman, who is his wife, and
hence he does not have the intent to commit rape. "One without legal capacity to
commit a crime cannot, in law, intend its commission." 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 746. Likewise a husband cannot personally commit an assault with intent
to ravish his wife. Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905).
86. 58 N.J.L. at 211, 33 Atl. at 210.
87. State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939). Accord, State v.
Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984 (1952).
88. "A male infant under the age of fourteen years, is presumed by law in-
capable to commit a rape, and therefore it seems cannot be found guilty of it" 4
BL. Comm. *212.
89. As regards a boy under fourteen "the law presumes him impotent, as well
as lacking discretion." 1 HALF,, P.C.,*630. ". . . as to this particular species of
felony [rape by boy under fourteen] the law supposes an imbecility of body as
well as mind." 4 BL. CoMm. *212.
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found in which an attempt to commit rape was charged against a boy
under fourteen. There are, however, cases where the indictment was
for assault with intent to rape. In Rer v. Eldershaw, a case fre-
quently cited, the trial judge told the jury that "From his age,
the law concludes that it is impossible for him to complete the offence,
and that, in my judgment, must be held to negative the intent [to
commit rape]." 90 A New York court in 1855 followed this rulingf
1
Bishop expressed a similar opinion, stating that ". . . no one can
legally intend what is legally impossible; for example, a boy too young
for rape can not in legal contemplation intend to commit it, or be
guilty of an attempt." 92 If the boy under fourteen is unable to form
the intent to ravish, it conclusively follows that he cannot be guilty
of an attempt to commit rape and "legal impossibility" in this connec-
tion means simply lack of the requisite intent.
There are two cases in this country where the question whether
an attempt to commit rape can be committed by a boy under fourteen
was squarely raised. In a Kentucky case in 1898 the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky sustained a conviction since the evidence showed
that, although the defendant was under fourteen he was physically
capable of committing rape and that he was "mentally capable of
understanding that it was wrong to do so." " In a Virginia case,
decided the same year, the Supreme Court of that state reversed a
conviction for the reason that "The accused being under fourteen
years of age, and conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing
the crime of rape, it logically follows, as a plain, legal deduction, that
he was also incapable in law of an attempt to commit . . . an offense
which he was physically impotent to perpetrate." " The problem of
physical impossibility will be discussed later.
90. Vaughan, B., in Rex v. Eldershaw, 3 C. & P. 396, 172 Eng. Rep. 472
(1828). Accord, Patteson, J., in Regina v. Philips, 8 C. & P. 736, 173 Eng. Rep.
695 (1839).
91. People v. Randolph, 2 Parker Cr. 213 (N.Y. 1855). In Commonwealth
v. Green, 2 Pick. 380 (Mass. 1824) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the conviction of a boy under fourteen years for an assault with intent to
commit a rape. The court (Parker, C. J., dissenting) stated the following: "The
law which regards infants under fourteen as incapable of committing rape, was
established in favorem vitae, and ought not to be applied by analogy to an inferior
offence, the commission of which is not punished with death . .. An intention to
do an act does not necessarily imply an ability to do it.... ".Id. at 381.
92. 1 BisHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 753.
93. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L.R. 540, 47 S.W. 213 (1898). In
addition to this case the following cases hold that the presumption a boy under
fourteen cannot commit rape may be rebutted: Williams v. State, 14 Ohio 222
(1846); Gordon v. State, 93 Ga. 531, 21 S.E. 54 (1893); Heilman v. Common-
wealth, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S.W. 731 (1886); State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 589, 108 N.W. 485
(1906).
94. Riely, J., in Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S.E. 503, 505
(1898).
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Factual Impossibility. When there is the intent to commit a
specific crime and a start made to carry out this intent, the accomplish-
ment of the crime may be rendered impossible by reason of (1) the
physical inability of the actor, (2) some inactive prevention or (3)
the active prevention of the intended victim or some other person, or
the intervention of some natural force. Examples of the actor's
physical inability to complete the crime are the following: A with the
intent to steal a safe tries to lift it but is not strong enough to do so;
A with the intent to murder fails in his effort to pull the trigger of a
pointed gun due to the heavy spring of the trigger or is stricken
with paralysis as he starts to pull the trigger; A with the intent to
commit a felony in a dwelling house fails to break open a door or to
climb a wall to reach a window by reason of physical weakness. In
all these cases the actor having the intent to commit a specific crime
has proceeded far enough to cause danger of damage.
Two situations involving physical incapacity have proved more
difficult of solution. The first of these is where a man attacks a woman
with intent to rape but is unable to complete the crime because he is
impotent. Although there are dicta to the contrary 95 it has been
squarely decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia that impotence of
itself is no defense to a charge of attempted rape.96 The court based
its decision on the following statement by Professor Strahorn: 7
"'When a defendant, with rape in mind and with the expectation
of accomplishing penetration seizes his female victim in the customary
manner in order to achieve his purpose and finds penetration impossible
because of inipotency, the authorities agree that he is guilty of a real Il
[sic] criminal attempt at rape, and that his impotency has no bearing
on the case except as possibly negativing the specific intention to
accomplish penetration.' "" Inability to complete the crime of rape
due to impotence is properly held to be no defense to an indictment
for the attempt since the defendant has proceeded far enough to cause
actual damage to the person of the woman.
A similar question is whether the physical incapacity of a boy
under fourteen years constitutes a defense to a charge of attempted rape.
95. Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 521, 527 (1850); Jeffers v. State, 20 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 294, 296 (1900); State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 589, 593, 108 N.W. 485, 487 (1906).
96. Preddy v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 765, 36 S.E2d 549 (1946).
97. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility ot Criminal Attempts, 78 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 962, 971-2 (1930).
98. The word "real" should be "relative."
99. Preddy v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 765, 774, 36 S.E.2d 549, 552 (1946).
It has been decided that impotence is no defense to a charge of assault with
intent to rape. Territory v. Keyes, 5 Dak. 244, 38 N.W. 440 (1888); Hunt v.
State, 114 Ark. 239, 169 S.W. 773 (1914).
Impotence may negative the intent to ravish. State v. Ballamah, 28 N.M. 212,
210 Pac. 391 (1922).
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The little judicial opinion on the question is to the effect that in such
a case physical impossibility is a defense. In an English case in 1892
Lord Coleridge, C. J., stated, by way of dictum, that ". . .it certainly
seems to me that a person cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit an
offence which he is physically incapable of committing. . . ." ' The
Supreme Court of Virginia in 1898 stated the following:
"The accused being under fourteen years of age, and conclusively
presumed to be incapable of committing the crime of rape, it logically
follows, as a plain, legal deduction, that he was also incapable in law
of an attempt to commit it. He could not be held to be guilty of an at-
tempt to commit an offense which he was physically impotent to per-
petrate." '01 The view expressed in these cases that there cannot be
an attempt by a person who is physically unable to commit the completed
crime is contrary to the decision that an impotent man may commit an
attempt to rape and seems unsound in principle, since all the requisite
elements of an attempt are present. By way of analogy there would be
an attempt to rape where a man with the necessary intent attacks a
woman but is temperamentally incapable of completing the offense.
102
100. Regina v. Waite, [1892] 2 Q.B. 600, 601 (1892).
101. Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S.E. 503, 505 (1898). Com-
menting on this statement of the Virginia Supreme Court Professor Beale stated
the following: "Why not, one might ask, is the weaker and less skilled of two con-
tending football teams incapable of trying to win the game?" Beale, supra note
1, at 499.
The question arose in a series of cases whether a boy under fourteen years of
age could be guilty of assault with intent to rape. In Massachusetts in 1823 the
defendant in such a case was convicted and a motion in arrest of judgment was
overruled, the court saying, "An intention to do an act does not necessarily imply
an ability to do it. . . ." Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 380, 382 (Mass.
1824). In 1828 the trial judge in an English case instructed the jury not to
convict saying "From his age, the law concludes that it is impossible for him to
complete the offence, and that, in my judgment, must be held to negative the
intent [to rape]. . . ." Vaughan, B., in Rex v. Eldershaw, 3 C. & P. 396, 172
Eng. Rep. 472 (1828). Eleven years later another English judge directed an
acquittal in a similar case but stated no reason. Patteson, J., in Regina v. Philips,
8 C. & P. 736, 173 Eng. Rep. 695 (1839). In 1855 the trial court in a New York
case, following the statement of Vaughan, B., in Rex v. Eldershaw, supra, in-
structed the jury not to convict. People v. Randolph, 2 Parker Cr. 213 (N.Y.
1855). In 1864 the Supreme Court of North Carolina followed the instructions given
the jury in Rex v. Eldershaw. supra and Regina v. Philips, supra, and stated
that "It is a logical solecism to say, that a person can intend to do what he is
physically impotent to do." Manly, J., in State v. Sam, 60 N.C. (1 Winst.) 300,
301 (1864).
It is interesting to note that the New York and North Carolina courts followed
the unsupported statement of a trial judge in an English case rather than the rea-
soned opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
102. "A man may fail in consummating a rape from some nervous or physical
incapacity intervening between attempt and execution. But this failure would be
no defense to the indictment for the attempt." 1 WHARTOx, op. cit. supra note 68,
at 300.
"The physical impossibility of accomplishing the crime will not be a bar to con-
viction"' Sayre, supra note 1, at 859.
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The problem of impossibility due to inactive prevention, which has
caused the most discussion, is that of the so-called "pickpocket cases,"
the background for which was laid in Regina v. M'Pherson,0'0 decided
in 1857. The defendant in this case was indicted for breaking and en-
tering a dwelling house and stealing certain specified articles. The evi-
dence showed that these articles were not in the house at the time of
defendant's entry. The jury convicted him of an attempt to steal the
articles. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved, by a unanimous vote,
quashed the conviction on the ground that the defendant could not be
guilty of an attempt since it was impossible for the defendant to steal
articles which were not in the house. One member of the court was
Coleridge, J., who later became Lord Coleridge, C. J. During the argu-
ment by Crown Counsel in favor of the conviction Bramwell, B., stated:
"It seems to me to be a legitimate conclusion from this argument, that
if I strike a vigorous blow at a log of wood, supposing it to be a man's
head, I should be liable to be convicted of an attempt to commit mur-
der." 104
The first "pickpocket" case, Regina v. Collins and others,105 was
decided in 1864. The indictment charged that the defendants "unlaw-
fully did attempt to commit a certain felony; that is to say, that they
did then put and place one of the hands of each of them into the gown
pocket of a certain woman, whose name is to the jurors unknown, with
intent the property of the said woman, in the said gown pocket then
being, from the person of the said woman to steal." The evidence
showed that one of the defendants put his hand in a woman's pocket,
but there was no evidence that there was or ever had been any property
in the pocket. The defendant was convicted but the Court for Crown
Cases Reserved quashed the conviction on the ground that the
case "is governed by Regina v. M'Pherson." During the argument
Bramwell, B., put the following questions:
"The argument that a man putting his hand into an empty pocket
night be convicted of attempting to steal, appeared to me at first plaus-
ible; but supposing a man believing a block of wood to be a man who
was his deadly enemy, struck it a blow intending to murder,' could he
be convicted of attempting to murder the man he took it to be?
"Suppose a man takes away an umbrella from a stand with intent
to steal it, 07 believing it not to be his own, but it turns out to be his
own, could he be convicted of attempting to steal?" 108
103. 7 Cox C.C. 281 (1857).
104. Id. at 284.
105. 9 Cox C.C. 497 (1864).
106. Emphasis added.
107. Emphasis added.
108. 9 Cox C.C. 497, 498 (1864).
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It will be noted that Bramwell is confusing intent and motive, a
distinction which is well recognized by English writers on jurispru-
dence.10 9 In the "block of wood case" the intent was to strike the par-
ticular object, which was the block of wood. Thus there was no intent
to murder, and therefore no attempt. In the "umbrella case" the intent
was to take the particular umbrella which was in fact the umbrella of
the taker. Thus there was no intent to steal, and consequently no
attempt. By similar reasoning it can be said that, while the defendants
in the Collins case expected to steal, there was no intent to steal any
property since it was not shown there was any property to steal. Ac-
cordingly it was properly decided that there was no attempt. Cockburn,
C. J., after correctly stating that Regina v. Collins was governed by
Regina v. M'Pherson, announced the following broad proposition,
which was not necessary for the decision of Regina v. Collins: "We
think that an attempt to commit a felony can only be made out when, if
no interruption had taken place, the attempt could have been carried
out successfully, and the felony completed of the attempt to commit
which the party is charged." "o
Regina v. Brown, decided in 1889, is a remarkable case. The de-
fendant was brought to trial before Lord Coleridge, C. J., and pleaded
guilty to a charge of attempting to commit unnatural offenses with do-
mestic fowls under a statute punishing such offenses with "an animal."
Subsequently Lord Coleridge was informed that it had been previously
decided in an unreported case, Regina v. Dodd, that a "duck was not an
animal" within the statute in question. He accordingly referred the
case of Regina v. Brown to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved over
which he presided. No counsel appeared in support of or against the
conviction. The court affirmed the conviction on the ground that it
was physically possible for the defendant to commit the completed of-
fense. Lord Coleridge, however, stated that he was informed by several
of his colleagues on the court, who had participated in the decision of
Regina v. Dodd, that this decision was not based upon the ground that
a duck was not an animal, but followed the holding in Regina v. Collins.
There are six reports of Regina v. Brown. In one of these Lord
Coleridge specifically stated, "We do not think that upon the facts,
this case comes within The Queen v. Collins, for there seems no doubt
that this boy could have completed the offence." I' He also stated
that "this is a decision with which we are not satisfied." 11 In two
109. See note 18 supra, where authorities are listed.
110. 9 Cox C.C. 497, 499 (1864).
111. 59 L.J.M.C. 47, 48 (1889).
112. Ibid.
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reports it is stated that Lord Coleridge said, Regina v. Collins is "a de-
cision with which we all agree" 113 and also that Regina v. Dodd "can
not be considered any longer as law" '114 since it proceeded on the au-
thority of Regina v. Collins. According to another report Lord Cole-
ridge said that Regina v. Collins is "a decision with which we are not
satisfied" and it is "no longer law." 115 In the fifth report Lord Cole-
ridge said, "we do not think the decision in R. v. Collins should any
longer be considered binding."" The sixth report, which is brief, con-
tains no reference to the Collins case.' 17
It should be noted that Lord Coleridge, while expressly recogniz-
ing that the problem of Regina v. Collins was not involved in the deci-
sion of Regina v. Brown, gave no reason for his conclusion that Regina
v. Collins was no longer law. Although the decision in that case was
based on the holding of Regina v. M'Pherson, in which he participated
as Coleridge, J., no reference to that case is made in his opinion, as
Lord Coleridge, C. J., in Regina v. Brown.""
In the trial of Ring and Others ".. in 1892 the defendants were
charged with "an attempt to steal from the person of a person un-
known." The evidence showed that the defendants "hustled" a woman
in a railway station and that one of them was seen endeavoring to find
her pocket. There was no evidence that there was anything in the
pocket. The defendants were convicted and a case was stated by the trial
judge for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. In his argument on
behalf of the prosecution Forrest Fulton said that "The case was
stated with the object of ascertaining whether Reg. v. Collins is good
law." 120 The conviction was affirmed and Lord Coleridge in his
opinion stated the following regarding Regina v. Collins:
"That case was overruled by the decision in Reg. v. Brown, a case
decided by five judges, and since this case will also be decided by five
judges, one of whom was one of the judges who decided Reg. v. Brown,
the learned judge who stated the case will have the satisfaction of know-
ing that now nine judges hold that Reg. v. Collins is bad law." 121
113. 61 L.T. 594, 595 (1889) and 16 Cox C.C. 715, 717 (1889).
114. Ibid.
115. 24 Q.B. 357, 359 (1889).
116. 38 W.R. 95, 96 (1889).
117. 54 J.P. 408 (1890).
118. Since no counsel appeared before the court in Regina v. Brown it is
possible that Lord Coleridge had forgotten the decision in Regina v. M'Pherso.,
which was made thirty-two years earlier. His biographer states that "his memory,
remarkably tenacious of matter germane to his tastes and predelictions, was not very
retentive of 'cases,' 'decisions,' 'reports."' COLERDGE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF LORD COLERFGE 286 (1904).
119. 17 Cox C.C. 491 (1892).
120. Id. at 492.
121. Ibid.
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Thus Regina v. Collins was overruled by weight of numbers, not
by force of reasoning, for no reason was stated to indicate why the de-
cision in this case not sound law.32
In this country there are only two cases in which it was decided,
apart from a statute, that a pickpocket, who puts his hand in another
person's pocket, can be convicted of an attempt to steal even though it
is not shown that there was any property in the pocket.M The holding
122. See page 482 supra.
English judges, in considering whether a common law crime was committed,
in most instances applied strictly the rules of law to the evidence of the particular
case and did not hesitate to decide that conduct, however atrocious, did not consti-
tute a particular crime unless all the elements of that crime were established by
proof. Whenever it was considered desirable to accomplish a change in the law,
this was done by a legislative enactment.
Fraudulent obtaining of property, while regarded by the courts as wrongful, was
held not to be larceny since the title as well as the possession passed. 1 BIsHoP,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 583. To meet this situation a statute was passed making
the obtaining of property by false pretences a felony. 30 GEO. II, c. 24 (1757). The
preamble of this statute was as follows: "Whereas divers evil-disposed persons, to
support their profligate way of life, have, by various subtle stratagems, threats, and
devices, fraudulently obtained divers sums of money, goods, wares, and merchandizes,
to the great injury of industrious families, and to the manifest prejudice of trade
and credit. . . ." Where the employee of a bank received money from a customer
and, instead of putting it in the till, appropriated it to his own use this was held
not to be larceny since the money had never been in the possession of the bank.
Rex v. Bazeley, 2 Leach 835 (4th ed. 1799). The same year a statute was enacted
making it a felony for an employee to embezzle funds entrusted to his possession.
39 GEo. III, c. 85 (1799). In a case where a defendant had intercourse with a
married woman by impersonating her husband it was decided that the crime of rape
was not committed since the wcman consented to the intercourse. Rex v. Jackson,
Russ. v. Ry. 487 (1822); Regina v. Saunders, 8 C. & P. 265, 173 Eng. Rep. 488
(1838). This conduct was later made criminal by statute. 48 & 49 VicT., c. 69,
§4 (1885).
In 1879 a Royal Commission recommended that the rule of Regina v. Collis
be changed by the following provision: "Every one who believing that a certain
state of facts exists, does or omits an act the doing or omitting of which would, if
that state of facts existed, be an attempt to commit an offence, attempts to commit
that offence, although its commission in the manner proposed was by reason of the
non-existence of that state of facts at the time of the act or omission impossible."
Report of Royal Commission, 224 PARL. PAP. App. § 74. Regarding this proposed
section the Commissioners stated the following:
"Section 74 deals with attempts to commit offences, and treats the act of a
person who with the intention to carry off the money he believes to be there puts
his hand into a pocket or breaks open a box, as an attempt to steal, though there was
no money in the pocket or in the box. This alters the law from what it has been
held to be." Id. at 19.
In contrast with the law of England, Scottish courts have an inherent power
to punish an act which they regard as criminal although it had never been the
subject of prosecution previously. The leading writer on Scottish criminal law has
stated that the Supreme Criminal Court (Court of Justiciary) has "an inherent
power as such competently to punish (with the exception of life and limb) every
act which is obviously of a criminal nature; though it be such which in time past
has never been the subject of prosecution." 1 HuME, COMMENTAIRIES ON THE LAW
OF SCOT AND RESPECTING CRIMES 12 (1844). Embezzlement and obtaining property
by false pretenses, although not coming within the definition of larceny, are treated
as common law crimes. MACDONALD, CRIMINAL LAW OF ScOTLAND 64, 89 (2d ed.
1877). When the case of a defendant who obtained sexual intercourse with a mar-
ried woman by impersonating her husband came before a court in Scotland it was
held this was punishable, although it did not constitute rape. H.M. Adv. v. Fraser,
Ark. 280 (1817).
123. State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862); People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441
(1881).
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in these cases, both of which were decided before Regina v. Collins,
followed a Massachusetts case in 1850,124 where the indictment charged
what the court described as "a peculiar statutory offense." 15
It should be noted that in all of the cases, in this country and Eng-
land, of prosecutions for an attempt to steal from an empty pocket there
was no evidence that the pocket had ever contained any property.
28
Nor was it shown the "victim" was aware that the defendant had in-
serted his hand in the pocket.'1
7
The opinion has been expressed in this country that the decision
in the "pickpocket cases" accomplishes a desirable result. This may be
so, but this result should be accomplished by legislation and not by a
stretching of the common law.128
124. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 5 Cush. 365 (Mass. 1850).
125. Fletcher, J., id. at 366. According to the statute ". . . every person, who
shall attempt to commit an offence prohibited by law, and shall in such attempt do
any act towards the commission of such offence, but shall fail in the perpetration, may
be indicted and punished."
The court based its decision on the following cases: King v. Higgins, 2 East
5 (1801); People v. Bush, 4 Hill 133 (N.Y. 1843); Josslyn v. Commonwealth,
6 Metc. 236 (Mass. 1843) ; Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 S. & R. 463 (Pa. 1819). None
of these cases supports the decision in Commonwealth v. McDonald. In King v.
Higgins the crime charged was solicitation, not attempt. In People v. Bush the de-
fendant, who was convicted of a statutory attempt, requested one Kinney to burn a
barn and gave him a match for the purpose, but Kinney never intended to commit the
crime. In Josslyn v. Commonwealth the defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering the shop of one Fogg with intent to steal the goods of Fogg. The court
in affirming the conviction stated as a dictum the result would be the same "if in
fact there were no goods, or no goods of Fogg, in the shop." Shaw, C. J., at 239.
In Rogers v. Commonwealth it was decided that an indictment for an assault with
intent to steal from the pocket need not state the goods or money intended to be
stolen, since "The crime was the assault; the intention is only aggravation."
Duncan, J., id. at 464. The Court of Appeals of New York, under a statute similar
to that in Massachusetts, followed the decision in Commonwealth v. McDonald.
People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890).
It has been held that there can be an attempt to commit larceny where the
defendant was observed to open a money drawer although there was no evidence
that there was any money or other article in the drawer. Clark v. State, 86 Tenn.
511, 8 S.W. 145 (1888). The court relied on Commonwealth v. McDonald, supra,
Rogers v. Commonwealth, supra, and State v. Wilson, supra note 123. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has held that in an indictment for an attempt to steal from
a dwelling house it is not necessary to allege that any particular articles were in the
house. State v. Utley, 82 N.C. 556 (1880). In Illinois, where grand larceny is a
felony and petit larceny a misdemeanor, it is necessary, in charging an attempt to
steal, to allege the value of the goods. People v. Purcell, 269 III. 467, 109 N.E. 1007
(1915).
126. Compare the following: "... in the pickpocket case, the emptiness of the
pocket was fortuitous; usually it contained things." HALL, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 124.
127. Compare the following: "This trespass and fear occur when the thief's
hand is thrust into the owner's pocket regardless of the presence of property."
Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. oF PA. L. REV.
962, 979 (1930).
128. It has been suggested that the defendants in the "pickpocket cases" should
be punished "in order to make discouragment broad enough and easy to understand."
HoLtrs, op. cit. supra note 57, at 70.
"The decisions in the empty pocket and unoccupied bed cases make social sense.
." HALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 129.
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A problem, similar to that of the "pickpocket cases," is whether a
person can be guilty of an attempt to commit abortion by using a
method, ordinarily successful, upon a woman who is not in fact "quick
with child." In a New Jersey case which, so far as the writer can
find, is the only case in which the question was squarely raised, the
Supreme Court decided that this was not an indictable attempt, stating
that there is "neither precedent nor authority" to support a contrary
view." 9 The court then stated that "If the good of society requires
that the evil should be suppressed by penal inflictions, it is far better
that it should be done by legislative enactments than that courts should,
by judicial construction, extend the penal code or multiply the objects
of criminal punishment." 13O
Another situation which raises the problem of factual impossibility
resulting from an inactive prevention is where a defendant with intent
to defraud makes a false representation but fails to obtain any property
because the representation is not believed. In this situation he has com-
mitted an attempt to obtain property by false pretenses, since he had the
requisite intent and his act has produced sufficient danger of damage.
The leading case on this point is Regina v. Hensler,113' where the de-
fendant wrote to the prosecutor a letter in which he asked for money
A case frequently discussed in connection with the "pickpocket cases" arose
under a statute providing that "every person who shall attempt to commit an offense
prohibited by law, and in such an attempt shall do any act towards the commission
of such offense, but shall fail in the perpetration thereof, or be intercepted or pre-
vented from executing the same" shall be guilty of a crime. State v. Mitchell, 170
Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902). According to the evidence the defendant, who was
planning to kill W, fired a pistol through the window of W's bedroom, the bullet
striking the pillow of the bed in which W usually slept, as was known to defendant,
but on this occasion W was sleeping in a room on another floor of his house.
The Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction, based its decision on the "pick-
pocket cases." It is difficult to find that the defendant in firing into the empty room
had the intent, as distinguished from the wish, to murder W. Suppose that at the
time the shot was fired W was a hundred miles away or had just died. In neither
of these supposed cases can it be established the defendant had the intent to murder W.
129. State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. (2 Zab.) 52, 58 (1849).
130. Ibid. An English statute, enacted in 1837, provided that "whosoever, with
the intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administer
to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing or shall un-
lawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall
be guilty of felony." 7 WzL. IV & 1 Vicr., c. 85, § 6 (1837). The Court for
Crown Cases Reserved decided that it was not necessary, under this statute, that
the woman be pregnant at the time. Regina v. Goodchild, 2 C. & K. 293, (spelled
Goodall) 2 Cox C.C. 41 (1846). This statute was enacted in several states in this
country and received a similar interpretation. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass.
261 (1882) ; Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144 (1898) ; State v. Russell, 90
Wash. 474, 156 Pac. 565 (1916); People v. Axelsen, 223 N.Y. 650, 119 N.E. 708
(1918). These cases have been cited by some writers for the proposition that there
may be a conviction of an attempt to commit abortion, although the woman was not
pregnant. Skilton, The Mental Element in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. OF Pirr. L.
ZEv. 181, 190 (1937); Comment, 26 COL. L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1926). 1rofessor
Strahorn clearly recognized that these cases are not relevant to the problem of an
attempt to commit abortion. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibilty on Criminal
Attempts, 78 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 962, 980 (1930).
131. 11 Cox C.C. 570 (1870).
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on the basis of a false representation, which the prosecutor knew to be
false and consequently did not send the money. The defendant was
convicted of an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses and the con-
viction was affirmed by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, Kelly,
C.B., saying that "as soon as ever the letter was put into the post the
offense was committed." 132 The same result had been reached in the
earlier cases of Regina v. Ball ' and Regina v. Roebuck,"3 4 which were
not cited in the Hensler case. In this country the Supreme Court of
Washington made a similar decision in the case of State v. Peterson,13
but did not cite any of the English cases discussed above. In a recent
Mississippi case '1 the defendants represented to prosecutrix that they
had found a pocket-book containing $105 and would share it with her
if she would get $100 from her bank to add to that amount. The pros-
ecutrix did not believe the representations and notified a police officer.
It was held that the defendants were guilty of an attempt to obtain
money by false pretenses. In all these cases the defendant on his own
initiative communicated a false representation to- the prosecutor, thus
making a start towards the accomplishment of the intended crime, which
later failed of success because the prosecutor did not believe the repre-
sentation.
In the present connection the much discussed case of Common-
wealth v. Johnson,137 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
is important. In that case the defendant, a licensed physician, was
convicted of an attempt to obtain property by false pretenses. Accord-
ing to the undisputed evidence two detectives, suspecting the defendant
of improper practices, went to his office and stated that they had a sister
(which was not the fact) who was failing in health. Defendant then
told one of the detectives to write the name of his sister on a piece of
paper. The detective wrote a fictitious name and gave the paper to
defendant who rubbed it on the knob of what was apparently an elec-
trical instrument, but was in fact not connected with any current. The
defendant then informed the detectives that their sister was suffering
from various diseases and that he could cure her by absent treatment
132. Id. at 573. During the course of the argument for the prisoner Blackburn, J.,
stated: "You may attempt to steal from a man who is too strong to permit you."
Mellor, J., stated: "Or an attempt may be made to steal a watch which is too
strongly fastened by a guard." Id. at 573.
133. C. & M. 249 (1842).
134. 7 Cox C.C. 126 (1856). Regina v. Roebuck and Regina v. Hensler, supra,
were approved and followed in Appeal of Light, 11 Cr. App. 111 (1915).
135. 109 Wash. 25, 186 Pac. 264 (1919).
136. Williams v. State, 209 Miss. 902, 48 So.2d 598 (1950).
137. 312 Pa. 140, 167 Atl. 344 (1933), discussed in 82 U. op PA. L. Rav. 61
(1933); 13 B.U.L. Rnv. 715 (1933); 8 TEMP. L.Q. 272 (1934); and Skilton, The
Requisite Act in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 308, 312 (1937).
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if paid a certain specified fee. Payment of the fee was made by one of
the detectives and shortly thereafter the defendant was arrested. On
appeal to the Superior Court the judgment of conviction was reversed.
The Commonwealth then appealed to the Supreme Court, which re-
versed the judgment of the Superior Court, Maxey, J., dissenting.
The majority opinion was written by Schaffer, J., who relied on the
"pickpocket cases" and the Ball, Roebuck and Peterson cases, cited
above.'"8 The principal reason advanced by Maxey, J., for his dis-
sent was that: "The defendant's state of mind was not followed by
any substantial overt act which took the defendant a single step nearer
the consummation of his imagined crime than he was when the crim-
inal intent was conceived." ' This conclusion seems to be irrefutable.
Again using the analogy of a race the defendant never crossed the
starting line..
Other examples of inactive prevention are the following: A with
the intent to murder B shoots at him but the bullet strikes an iron rod
and is deflected or strikes a bullet-proof vest which B is wearing; 140
a man with the intent to burn a wooden house applies a flame but the
wood being damp is not ignited; A seizes a satchel in B's hand but is
unable to secure it because it is fastened with a chain to B's wrist; 141
A with the intent to murder B injects typhoid fever germs, but B
has been rendered immune by a preventive vaccine.
The cases of active prevention present no difficulties since in all of
them, in addition to the necessary intent, there is damage or the danger
of damage, and the fact that it is impossible to complete the crime is
entirely immaterial. Examples of active prevention are: A with the
intent to ravish a girl is unable to overcome her resistance 142 or to catch
her as she runs away; 143 A with the intent to murder does not succeed
in strangling a resisting man; A with the intent to kidnap a child is
138. Schaffer, J., also stated the following reason for the decision of the ma-
jority: "If this were held to be no attempt because there was no deception, then
criminals of this kind, committing this offense, which is a subtle form of larceny,
could go on plying their illicit trade, until they find a dupe, and would thus have a
favored status in the law over other thieves." 312 Pa. at 148, 167 Atl. at 347. This
statement would seem to be more fitting as an argument to be presented to a legis-
lature for a change in the law than as a reason for a judicial decision.
139. 312 Pa. at 151, 167 Atl. at 344.
140. Beale, supra note 1, at 496.
141. "One had his keys tied to the strings of his purse in his pocket, which
Elizbeth Wilkinson attempted to take from him, and was detected with the purse
in her hand; but the strings of the purse still hung to the owner's pocket by means
of the keys." 2 EAST P.C. *356.
142. "But if a real woman occupied the place of the effigy, and he undertook
to ravish her, yet unknown to him she carried a revolver, and with it disabled him
so that he could not effect his object, surely in reason, and it is believed in law
also, he would commit a criminal attempt." 1 BishoP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 742.2.
143. Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860).
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unable to pull the child from the strong arms of its nurse; A attacking
B with a knife is knocked unconscious by B or is shot in the shoulder
by him; A with the intent to murder B gives him a deadly poison but a
physician succeeds in saving his life; A with the intent to murder B
points a loaded gun at him but is shot, but not killed, by B's bodyguard
or is seized by an officer; 144 A puts a venomous snake in B's bedroom
but the snake is driven out by a watchful detective; ' A breaks into
B's bedroom with intent to murder him but is immediately chased out
by B's faithful watch dog; A points a pistol at B but before he can fire
is rendered unconscious by a stroke of lightning; A with the intent to
burn a house strikes a match to light prepared combustibles but the
wind blows out the match.14
As a conclusion from the foregoing discussion it may be stated
that, when it has been established there was the intent to commit a spe-
cific crime and to carry out this intent an act or acts were committed,
which caused damage or sufficient danger of damage, the fact that for
some reason it is impossible to complete the intended crime should not
be, and is generally held not to be, a defense to a prosecution for the
attempt.
144. See Stokes v. State, 92 Miss. 415, 46 So. 627 (1908); Trent v. Common-
wealth, 155 Va. 1128, 156 S.E. 567 (1931).
145. See CONAN DoYL_, THE SPEcsuLED BAND.
146. See Queen v. Goodman, 22 U.C.C.P. 338; Sayre, supra note 1, at 847 n.93.
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